I have been asked to discuss with you the
topic ‘Offshore Trusts and Confidentiality’ which, at first
blush appears to be somewhat disparate topics. Yet, although offshore
trusts and confidentiality are both important, independent offshore financial
products, there are important points at which they interface.
My subtopic, ‘Is
Confidentiality Inconsistent with Creating Wealth?’ will no doubt
appear to be a curious and even outlandish proposition to those
familiar with the offshore sector, a sector which has defined itself in
keeping with strict confidentiality norms.
As I pondered on
the proposition, that confidentiality is inconsistent with creating wealth,
I could not help but feel somewhat indignant that we, in this region,
are even contemplating this question. It is therefore pertinent for me
to say something about the philosophical undertones of this topic, and
indeed the very way in which we now wish to describe or market the offshore
sector.
To my mind, the question
speaks to a certain defeatist acceptance of what has been a concerted
effort by our detractors to negative perfectly acceptable, well established
legal principles and concepts which the offshore financial sector utilizes,
concepts such as confidentiality. No doubt we are all aware of the attempts
at ‘blacklisting’ the offshore sector, in particular, the
OECD initiative and especially the accusations of money laundering. The
first point of objection is my point of view that confidentiality has
been largely used as a scapegoat, to promote the idea that it encourages
money laundering, tax evaders etc.
I have always maintained
that the entire dialogue (or was it a monologue) on the offshore sector
and money laundering was really somewhat of a legal farce, an attempt
to cloak what is the real issue, the loss of dollars and cents, monies
being filtered off from rich, developed countries, to relatively poor,
politically insignificant developing countries. Particularly significant
is the loss of potential tax revenue.
Notably, it was not
easy to attack the offshore sector by simply using arguments centred on
tax since, if anything, legal principles both in relation to domestic
revenue law and international law, actually favoured the offshore position
that an investor is free to invest his or her money offshore for tax mitigation
purposes. The relevant principles at play include the Westminster principle
on the legality of tax avoidance as opposed to tax evasion (the latter
alone traditionally being illegal) and the principle of international
law that no country enforces the fiscal law of another. It should also
be observed that onshore countries themselves rely on these very same
legal principles in all other areas of law. Indeed, it would be difficult
to fault offshore legal principles and concepts in themselves, whether
it be the trust, conflict of laws, confidentiality etc. Hence, the introduction
of a red herring.
We may add to this
conundrum the fact that there are no clear rules of international law
as to who should have the jurisdiction to tax what is in essence, transnational
investment. In fact, I believe that this is one of the areas for which
we should be lobbying.
Consequently, the
blacklisting related initiatives were not significantly about money laundering.
To date, no one has been able to demonstrate that the offshore sector
is plagued with more money laundering or illegal activity than other so
called respectable financial sectors. Indeed, the opposite may be true,
when we think of the recent financial debacles in the US, London, Italy
and Russia.
The result of linking
confidentiality so intimately to money laundering etc. has been that confidentiality in
the offshore sector has acquired a bad name, a negative image. In
fact, the concept has been vilified.
Confidentiality Protected in Other Fields of
Endeavour
Curiously though, on examination of the jurisprudence,
confidentiality remains a viable and much respected principle in other
areas of commercial endeavour not associated with offshore investment.
For example, the United States and Canada have fought hard and long to
protect the principle of financial confidentialiy in terms of trade secrets,
arguing precisely that it is essential for business, in order
to sustain wealth.
Further, I have unearthed
several cases outside of the offshore arena, where the US has argued vociferously
against disclosure in commercial endeavours, arguing that there was a ‘strong
and vital interest’ in protecting confidentiality.2
Similarly, in employment
and commercial law, we learn about duties of trust and confidence. More
broadly, we accept without question the notion of confidentiality in fiduciary
relationships generally. This is considered a founding principle of the
common law, recognized in tort law, contract law, company law, employment
law etc, essential for maintaining those protected relationships. In many
cases these relationships are concerned with commerce and business. Thus,
confidentiality in other quarters is a legitimate and much protected principle
precisely because of its value to business and wealth creation and sustenance.
How is it then that it is detrimental to business once that business is
in the offshore sector?
To my mind, I identify
a certain hypocrisy in the debate. And I believe that it is important
for us in the offshore sector not just to lobby in an apologetic way,
begging for life-lines by promising to toe the line, but to engage seriously
in the debate about legal principle. We must challenge these assumptions
and deliberate attempts to illegalize and denigrate what are indeed, perfectly
legitimate principles of law and policies based on these legal concepts.
In fact, I believe
that the more we question offshore confidentiality and other offshore
financial products because of this new found insecurity about the correctness
of our legal position, the more we come to the table with this apologist
approach, that is when confidentiality and everything else in the offshore
sector will be bad for business. If we treat our preciously constructed
financial products and concepts as somehow unsavoury, then clearly investors
will get that message and begin to feel uncomfortable about investing
with us. You, the business people among you, know far better than I, the
need for a certain climate before people will put their money into investments.
So, yes, by all means,
let us be aware that confidentiality can sometimes be abused but let us
be confident that this of itself does not make confidentiality an abusive
or illegal concept.
We also need to address
the supposition that confidentiality itself is bad, that it must
be eliminated, simply because it can be used for abuse. This is a peculiar
way of looking at legal concepts or indeed, any kind of system.
For example, we have
heard of huge financial scandals in the onshore world, such as Enron and
BCCI, where accountants and financial brokers etc. have abused their fiduciary
duties and committed huge crimes, but I have never heard anyone suggest
that we should do away with the accountancy profession or the financial
principles upon which it is based, or the stock market or anything of
that nature! No, we have merely accepted that in every financial endeavour
and structure there will be weaknesses and what we simply need to do is
to have checks and balances and avenues for redress. Indeed, offshore
law contains such legislative checks and balances. Yet, once there is
the mere suggestion (and it is often simply a suggestion) that confidentiality
leads to some type of abuse, then we begin to question
the very legitimacy of confidentiality as a legal principle.
What we have done
therefore is to allow those who wish to destroy the offshore sector
for reasons of self interest to define us.
COPYCATS – SUPPORT
AND LEGITIMISE OFFSHORE POLICIES AND PRODUCTS
And so, while we
have begun to doubt ourselves and the financial products that we have
created for economic sustainability, products which are based on sound
business and legal principles, those who criticize us are busy emulating
us, putting in place the very financial products that they have criticized,
including the very principles of confidentiality. We see this in several
US states such as in Atlanta, in Delaware for example. What better argument
do we need for accepting that confidentiality, offshore trusts and IBCs
are not only legitimate and lawful, but that they are great for
business and wealth creation!
In truth, I welcome
these- what I have termed ‘onshore-offshore’
sectors in Atlanta
and elsewhere, for while they are our business competitors, they help
to legitimise the offshore sector and encourage its more innovative concepts
and products into the mainstream of commerce. This can only aid in wealth
creation as it creates a certain comfort level.
CONFIDENTIALITY IS A LONG STANDING AND WELL RESPECTED
PRINCIPLE
I therefore argue
for the legitimacy of financial confidentiality as a legal principle.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the several legal and financial products which
the offshore sector has created. It is no accident that the banking sector,
for example, has long operated on the understanding of the value of the
confidentiality ethic. This is supported by the common law, in the Tournier3 case and
other common law norms.
In the case of trusts,
trustees have a well established duty under orthodox trust law, to keep
the affairs of the trust confidential. Amazingly, the OECD even sought
to attack this duty, although it applies equally to every single onshore
trust.
INVESTORS WANT AND DESIRE CONFIDENTIALITY
Further, the proposition
that confidentiality is bad for wealth creation seems curious from another
point of view, since it can be demonstrated that the viability of offshore
financial products, including trusts, depends to a large extent on this
characteristic confidentiality ethic. Offshore trusts have been able to
secure assets and maintain their integrity, even where onshore legislation
specifically targets such trusts. Certain unclear principles related to
the confidentiality of the trust in general have also been tested
and clarified largely as a result of offshore structures and challenges.
Despite the positives
in relation to offshore trusts and confidentiality, it is also true that,
at the same time, the erosion of confidentiality and the persistent aggression
which it faces, pose threats to offshore trusts.
Offshore Confidentiality
Let us examine this offshore legal concept of confidentiality
more carefully. Clearly, it is somewhat different to its common law neighbour.
It is what I call a hybrid concept. It encompasses strict and extremely
broad-based statutory duties of confidentiality, sometimes with criminal
penalties attached, in all aspects of business. Indeed, it is a good example
of the efficiency and dynamism of offshore law4. Confidentiality in offshore
jurisdictions is valued in of itself and many investors choose offshore
jurisdictions specifically for added confidentiality norms. As such, it
is appropriately described as a financial or legal product in the offshore
sector.
Confidentiality as
an offshore law product, has been responsible for creating significant
and sustaining opportunities in the offshore sector. On the other hand,
it is the concept which has perhaps antagonised onshore actors the most.
We have already mentioned that confidentiality has acquired something
of a bad name for itself due to linkages, often erroneous, to money laundering,
fraud and tax evasion. Powerful onshore nations, such as the US, have
campaigned, somewhat effectively, to whittle away the confidentiality
norms in offshore states.
Today, therefore,
stricter anti-money laundering laws and increasing tax reporting and other
information requirements have undermined the strong confidentiality laws
in place in offshore jurisdictions. Yet, confidentiality is still a valuable,
legitimate principle and product, justifiable in commerce. Investors who
have clean hands have nothing to fear, as reasonable suspicion underlines
the several laws put into place which can thwart confidentiality. To such
investors, confidentiality and the legal principles now attached to
it will in no way hinder investment and ultimately wealth creation.
Limits to
Confidentiality
Notably, a distinction
should be made about the kinds of pressures which will result in disclosure.
Where, for example, there is prima facie evidence of fraud or money laundering,
confidentiality will and must succumb to the greater interest in disclosure
and law enforcement. In contrast, offshore jurisdictions have resisted
attempts to automatically defeat confidentiality where routine reporting
or disclosure relating to fiscal matters is involved. This approach is
supported by the well established rule of international law that no country
enforces the fiscal laws of another.
Such resistance is
enhanced because of offshore structures and arrangements which seek to
ensure that onshore states do not have jurisdiction over offshore entities
and actors. Consequently, for confidentiality to be effective and aid
in wealth creation, it must work in tandem with jurisdiction strategies.
Offshore trustees,
for example, fall outside such jurisdiction and cannot be forced to
disclose matters relating to offshore investment, whatever laws exist
onshore for such disclosure. While some offshore states have succumbed
to onshore pressures and signed tax information Agreements, the status
quo in relation to confidentiality in such matters largely remains. This
ensures that the opportunities which exist in relation to confidentiality
endure.
Enhanced
Confidentiality Norms
Further, while offshore
Legislatures have been attempting to erode confidentiality because of
fears of hiding tax advantages, money laundering and even terrorist activity,
in other areas of offshore law, confidentiality has assumed a greater
status. The best example is perhaps the development in relation to information
on the offshore trust. The offshore trust, like its other offshore law
counterparts, is protected by the confidentiality laws of the offshore
jurisdiction. Questions have arisen however, as to the right of beneficiaries
to the trust to glean information about the trust. The traditional view,
although inconsistent, was that the law required beneficiaries to have
information about accounts or to be informed about the existence of the
trust since the trustee is ultimately accountable to the beneficiaries.
However, in a landmark Privy Council judgment, Rosewood Trust Ltd v Schmidt5,
the court found that there was no legal principle which required beneficiaries
or any other party to have information on the trust. Rather, this was
a question to be left to the discretion of the court.
This is significant
for investment opportunities as it underscores the confidentiality ethic
created under statute law in offshore jurisdictions. In some cases, settlors
wish to specifically prevent beneficiaries or third parties from either
learning of the existence of the trust or having more detailed information.
So this confidentiality is why they have chosen the offshore product for
business. Examples include spendthrift trusts which attempt to preserve
assets and trusts established to preclude forced heirs in civil law jurisdictions.
Constitutional
Protections
Fundamental norms on confidentiality may exist outside
of the common law under human rights law, under the rubric of the right
to privacy. In fact, it is arguable that our constitutions can be stretched
to include a viable notion of financial privacy in certain circumstances.
The underlining of
confidentiality norms with constitutional protections such as the right
to privacy or the privilege against self-incrimination enhances considerably
the value of confidentiality as an offshore financial product. Whilst
constitutional privacy protections were not successfully protected by
the court in The Bahamas in one case which challenged the financial reporting
requirements in that jurisdiction. In Re Financial Clearing Corporation6,
this was not because it failed to be identified but rather because it
succumbed to greater interests of law enforcement.
However, other successes
have been scored for confidentiality. The European Court on Human Rights,
for example, has found that documents and financial records, even those
wanted for tax purposes are protected by privacy, and that governments
must, at least, act in accordance with the principle of proportionality,
that is, taking the route least invasive of individual human rights. Further,
as echoed in our courts, governments must act reasonably,
and only as is necessary in a free and democratic society.7
Automatic demands
for information unrelated to some reasonable cause, where fishing expeditions
etc. are involved, are therefore unacceptable. In most offshore jurisdictions
the issue has not been tested directly in the courts. However, in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, cases such as Bethel v Douglas8 and
the like reveal that similar considerations are at play. Similarly, in
Australia and other parts of the Commonwealth progressive courts sensitive
to commercial concerns have located privacy interests in financial confidentiality.
The clothing of financial
confidentiality with a human rights ethos gives the concept added legitimacy
as well as better security in a practical sense. This can only add to
and not subtract from financial objectives such as investment and wealth
protection.
The Offshore Trust
Let us now examine
more closely the financial vehicle of the offshore trust which derives
so many benefits from confidentiality under offshore law. Perhaps the
trust can be described as the most interesting and important offshore
vehicle and the one with enormous potential for investors. Like offshore
confidentiality, the offshore trust is a statutory creature and is related
to, but different from its well- known common law cousin. It has deviated
significantly from the more orthodox and allows certain functions, such
as self-settling and spendthrift functions. The offshore trust is versatile,
providing opportunities in probate, particularly cross border, facilitating
tax mitigation, creditor protection, making company matters more efficient
and far-reaching and even protecting trustees against negligence suits.
Revolutionary
Character
The revolutionary
character of offshore trusts law is manifested both in the type of trusts
offered and in the functions permitted under offshore law. Offshore law
allows a host of things that a traditional trust cannot do, or do effectively.
Most importantly, given the commercial objectives of offshore law, offshore
trusts are more closely aligned to business and companies than their onshore
counterparts. The latest offshore trust creation, the VISTA trust,9 demonstrates
well the intricate relationship between the offshore trust and the company
in offshore financial centres, and in so doing, underlines the kinds of
business opportunities that exist. The VISTA trust allows traditional
obligations of trustees with respect to the use of shares in investment,
to be exercised by directors of underlying companies. In so doing, it
insulates such trustees from bludgeoning common law liabilities which
may accrue from risky commercial ventures.10
It is not surprising
that these innovative trusts should invite challenge from onshore jurisdictions.
A first line of defence is the protection offered by the concept of offshore
confidentiality as the strict confidentiality laws and policies of offshore
jurisdictions extend to trusts. We have already seen that the offshore
trust is further protected by special principles which attach to trusts
as enunciated in the Schmidt case and because of confidence duties
attached to trustees.
We should note too
that one of the reasons that the offshore trust is such an attractive
vehicle for wealth creation and business is because of its inherent makeup,
that is, a three tiered structure. In this complex structure, there is
a trustee, a settlor and a beneficiary. More importantly, the trustee
holds the assets on behalf of a beneficiary. Where, as is often
the case, the offshore trust is created with an underlying company or
utilizes a confidential bank account, a triple level of security is created
for investors.
Because of the
extent to which the offshore trust is used in offshore finance for a wide
variety of functions such as, for example, tax mitigation, by extension
these confidentiality protections are able to be applied to a great variety
of usages.
Another remarkable
advancement of the offshore trust is its ability to cater to the needs
of investors from civil law jurisdictions unfamiliar with the trust. Offshore
legislation permit such investors to establish trusts, granting them capacity,
and make provision for the recognition of the offshore trust. This latter
feature is in fact compatible with the Hague Convention on Trusts,11 further
underlining the legitimacy of offshore products. Most importantly for
such investors, they are able to avoid onerous succession rules which
force them to leave assets for heirs (forced heirship regimes). This would
be impossible under ordinary trust law.
Other important features
of the offshore trust include:
(1)- the ability to abolish perpetuity and accumulation
rules or extend them; thereby allowing the creation of dynasty trusts,
trusts which can continue for longer or even indefinite periods and fulfilling
longer-term investment objectives;
(2) - creating purpose trusts and thus abolishing rules
that a trust must have an identifiable beneficiary This rule against
trusts without identifiable beneficiaries is without real justification
in a modern commercial environment. Offshore trusts make it possible for
the commercial objectives of the trust to be realised adequately;
(3) - making it more difficult for onshore creditors
to reach trust assets; and
(4) - defeating the Saunders v Vautiers rule
whereby beneficiaries can come together to conclude the trust, and thereby
frustrate trust objectives, particularly where these are business objectives.
In this latter objective, confidentiality is again helpful.
Further insulation
for the trust comes from the conflict of law rules found under offshore
laws, which preclude enforcement of hostile onshore judgments, provide
for exclusive jurisdiction over offshore entities, facilitate offshore
law as the proper law. Some of these bold laws have already been tested
successfully in the courts. For example, in Green v Jernigan,12 a
Canadian court upheld an exclusive jurisdiction law clause used in the
formation of an offshore trust in Nevis.
Since many of the
offshore conflict of law rules mirror that of the Hague Convention on
Trusts, like minded cases such as Casani v Mattei13 aid
us in proving the legitimacy and viability of these new legal principles.
In this important case, an Italian court upheld a trust which attempted
to avoid forced heirship laws, declaring it not against public policy,
and also proclaimed that the trust was recognisable under Italian law
(civil law).
Developments
on Sham Trusts
Offshore trust provisions
which allow greater roles for settlors have sometimes run afoul of the
law under the sham rule, despite offshore legislation which sought to
prevent sham attacks.14 However, more recent developments illustrate that
the sham doctrine is not as great a danger as previously thought. These
important decisions have revised the harsh Rahman15 interpretation
of the sham concept which was threatening to overwhelm offshore trusts.
The correct interpretation, as demonstrated in Re Abacus,16 is
that for a trust to be declared a sham, mere evidence of settlor influence
is not sufficient. Rather, there must have been a common intention on
the part of both the trustees and the settlor to create a sham. Further,
the court found nothing odd about trustees succumbing easily to settlor
demands for benefits under the trust since the trustee should be seeking
to preserve a harmonious relationship. Thus, the notion of the unilateral
sham is now severely undermined, if not totally discredited.
Here, we should distinguish
between the more aggressive unilateral US approach, which in fact, has
sometimes treated offshore confidentiality as one indicator of a sham
(Anderson), and the UK approach which is based on purer rules
of the sham doctrine, untainted by considerations of the purpose and effects
of the offshore sector.
It is clear therefore,
that these trust mutants and the resulting legal principles offer significant
new opportunities for investors.
When we juxtapose
the principles surrounding confidentiality and in particular, the Schmidt rule
outlined above, these opportunities are enhanced.
Reservations on Confidentiality
Notwithstanding the many advantages of confidentiality
which attach to offshore trusts and advance the commercial objectives
of offshore finance, there is another side to the equation.
There is no doubt
that the strong confidentiality ethic of offshore jurisdictions has engendered
much suspicion and hostility onshore, resulting in greater regulation
of the offshore centre. More onerous tax reporting requirements, for example,
can be traced back to confidentiality obstacles. Yet, we have seen that
confidentiality is a concept which is not to be feared in of itself. Rather,
it is its capacity to hide the flow of revenue from onshore to offshore
jurisdictions. It is because of this loss of income that the confidentiality
principle, a legitimate principle in of itself, has been challenged so
vociferously.
The question remains
therefore, were we to dismantle the confidentiality structures and policies
of offshore jurisdictions, would onshore countries be more accepting of
the aim and objectives of offshore centres. I do not believe so, as the
threats of competition from offshore centres would remain. Nonetheless,
the more onshore regulators suspect that there is something to hide, the
more they will attempt to go after it. My view on this is why is it our
duty to make it easier for such regulators? We have just as much right
to protect our investment goals as they do and can.
In fact, it is very
telling that the infamous line of bank cases which were fought on confidentiality
issues in which certain offshore banks were being threatened with contempt
actions by US courts for refusing to disclose information on offshore
clients (in accordance with offshore law),17 was framed within the context
of comity, i.e. which state had the ‘greater interest’ in
protecting confidentiality or dismantling it. The political and economic
dimensions of this legal battle contextualised within principles of private
international law, was very evident and even commented upon by other onshore
states, such as Canada and the UK. They saw it as a question of might
over right (vulnerable offshore states). In one case, the UK court protested
that such an approach merely resulted in a solution or win going to the ‘highest
bidder’. The US courts made no apologies, stating that this confidentiality
debate was about revenue, especially tax revenue ‘ the lifeblood
of their economy’. In every single case going before the US courts,
although they claimed to balance conflicting interests between offshore
and onshore in the name of comity, the interests of the US prevailed.
This, despite the fact that the offshore sector is the sole or most important
revenue earner in the offshore jurisdictions concerned and tax is but
one aspect of the US economy.
At the end of the
day, the key issue is about ‘balance’. We can respect the
requests of onshore jurisdictions for more disclosure where activities
such as money laundering etc. are suspected, as this is a morally accepted
neutral rationale for disclosure. Where, however, disclosure has as its
aim only the facilitation of revenue creation in onshore jurisdictions
at the expense of offshore jurisdictions, then it is more suspect and
ethically illegitimate. This is all the more so when we consider that
the mores, practices and very legal principles created and developed by
offshore jurisdictions have now been adopted in certain onshore jurisdictions
which make no apology for this phenomenon.18
In conclusion, I
reiterate that in the final analysis, there is no greater testimony to
the legitimacy, efficiency and viability of offshore precepts, including
confidentiality, than the ‘borrowing’ from hostile neighbours –‘ if
we can’t beat them, then we must join them’.
Professor Rose-Marie Belle Antoine
Deputy Dean and Professor of Labour Law and
Offshore Law
University of the West Indies
LLB (UWI); LLM (Cambridge); DPHIL (Oxon)
rantoine@uwichill.edu.bb
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